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After World War II, most currencies were not convertible, so that investors could only invest in
foreign markets if they could get access to often scarce foreign currencies. In addition to
convertibility restrictions, most countries also had explicit restrictions on foreign investment. In some
cases, foreign investors could not buy local shares. In other cases, domestic investors were not
allowed to hold foreign shares. If foreign investors could buy local shares, they did not always have
voting rights and often there was a limit on foreign ownership. Most countries had explicit foreign
ownership limits of one type or another creating significant barriers to international investment. In
addition to restrictions resulting from laws and regulations, there were other less formal obstacles to
international investment. Foreign equity investment was also made difficult by political risk,
inadequate institutions to deal with ownership of foreign shares, lack of accounting harmonization
across countries, and obstacles to hedging foreign exchange rate risk. 
Over the last fifty years, barriers to international investment have crumbled among developed
economies and have fallen dramatically among many emerging markets. As a result of this evolution,
U.S. investors can buy the securities of a large number of foreign countries with almost no
restrictions. Corporations can choose where to raise funds and have access to both offshore and
onshore markets. Asian investors now worry about how the U.S. markets performed while they were
asleep because they believe that the fate of their markets during the day depends on what happened
in New York over the previous twelve hours. Similarly, morning news shows in the U.S. routinely
discuss the overnight performance of Asian markets and try to forecast the performance of U.S.
markets from the overnight returns of the Nikkei and Hang Seng indices. Though finance academics
have generally welcomed this process of globalization and emphasized its benefits to investors and
corporations, many policymakers have questioned whether this process has gone too far and whether1 See Ando and Auerbach (1988) for an analysis of the issues that arise when comparing
the cost of capital across countries when taxes are taken into account. We ignore taxation of the
cash flows to equity in this paper because these taxation issues are of secondary importance in our
analysis. 
2 “The hardest problem all through my business career was to obtain enough capital to do
all the business I wanted to do and could do, given the necessary amount of money.” Cited by
Chernow (1997), p. 68.
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controls on capital flows should be reintroduced. The recent upheavals in Asia and Russia have led
to the reimposition of some barriers to international investment. 
In this paper, we evaluate how this process of globalization affects the cost of equity capital
of companies. Though a firm’s total cost of capital also depends on its cost of debt, the cost of debt
depends in subtle ways on how a firm is taxed. By focusing on the cost of equity capital, we avoid
dealing with complicated taxation issues.
1 In Section I, we investigate how globalization affects the
discount rate of a given stream of equity cash flows. We show that there are strong theoretical
arguments for why this discount rate should fall when markets become more open to foreign
investors. Such a fall in the discount rate means that both the value of equity and  investment increase.
Neo-classical financial economists and a number of consulting firms would argue that what
we call the discount rate is simply the cost of capital for an all-equity firm. However, managers and
financial economists who emphasize the importance of information asymmetries and agency costs do
not think about the cost of capital in this way. Rockfeller used to explain that his main problem in
business was to raise capital. He generally found this to be an extremely difficult and costly process
that prevented him from investing as much as he felt was worthwhile.
2 There are two important
reasons for this. First, managers are typically better informed about expected future cash flows than
investors. This is the information asymmetry problem. Second, management has its own objectives3 See Stulz (1990). 
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that may differ from those of investors. This is the agency costs problem. These two problems interact
in important ways. Typically, management wants the firm to grow. As a result, managers and
investors often disagree about expected cash flows. Because  managers usually want to raise as much
capital as they can, it will almost always be the case that investors do not believe that expected cash
flows are as high as management forecasts.
3 As a result, management cannot raise as much capital
as it wants for new projects. Also, for existing firms, management may have to give up too much of
the value of the firm to raise the capital it wants. Viewed from this perspective, a firm’s cost of capital
depends crucially on the firm’s governance, which we define broadly as the set of mechanisms that
affect how the information and agency costs problems impact firm value. Firms with poor governance
are then firms where the information asymmetry and agency costs problems are important. Such firms
find it more expensive to raise funds. 
In Section II of the paper, we address the impact of governance on the cost of capital and
argue that globalization affects firm governance in several ways. First, globalization means that new
shareholders invest in a firm. In general, these investors have skills and information that enable them
to monitor management in ways local investors could not. Second, globalization transforms the
relationship between a firm and providers of capital. In small closed markets, there is little
competition among suppliers of capital. A firm wanting to raise large amounts of capital faces the
problem that few investors and institutions can help it do so.  This increases transaction costs
associated with raising capital and limits the types of securities that a firm can sell. Globalization
creates competition among suppliers of capital. This reduces the cost of capital for firms both in that
it reduces the rents that accrue to the capital providers and reduces transaction costs. Third,4
globalization transforms the market for corporate control. A firm that is large in its local market might
not be large in the world markets. A firm that is safe from takeovers in a closed local market is not
safe in an open market. Therefore, globalization increases the monitoring of managers both from
existing shareholders and from potential bidders. Fourth, globalization gives firms access to financial
technology that enables them to raise funds using new securities and to manage their risks more
effectively. Not all of these effects of globalization on governance are unambiguously positive. For
instance, globalization can enable firms to break off existing relationships that constrained them from
making poor investments. Further, new financial technologies can enable managers to pursue
strategies that do not benefit the shareholders. We therefore attempt to evaluate the impact of
globalization on governance taking into account both positive and negative effects. 
In Section III, we review the existing evidence on the impact of globalization on the cost of
capital and present some new evidence. We present a condition that must be met for globalization to
decrease the cost of capital when investors have equal constant relative risk aversion across countries.
We provide evidence that shows that this condition holds for all countries in our sample. In the U.S.,
the traditional approach to evaluate the discount rate is to look at the average of the rate of return
on a broad-based market index for a long period of time. Unfortunately, this approach is not useful
when a process of globalization is taking place because this approach assumes that the discount rate
is constant. We therefore review alternative approaches to estimate the discount rate. In many ways,
studies that look at returns around times of unexpected changes in the degree of globalization of a
country or a firm can provide the best picture of the impact of globalization on the discount rate.
These studies show that opening markets decreases the discount rate, but not as dramatically as
theory would predict. 5
In Section IV, we discuss possible reasons for why the impact of globalization on the cost of
capital has not been as large as theory would suggest. We argue that the main explanation for this is
that investors do not invest as much abroad as would be expected if they held the world market
portfolio. We advance a number of alternative explanations for this phenomenon.
Section I. The impact of the removal of barriers to international investment on the discount
rate.
In this section, we explore the impact of the removal of barriers to international investment
on the cost of capital. To narrow the scope of the inquiry, we ignore exchange rates and assume that
money markets are internationally integrated. In other words, we proceed as if there are one currency
and one interest rate and focus on the question of how globalization of equity markets affects the cost
of capital. By proceeding this way, we ignore an important aspect of globalization. If money markets
are not integrated, the interest rate in a country has to be such that savings and investment are
balanced. Consequently, the interest rate will unexpectedly increase as a country’s investment
opportunities unexpectedly improve. With globalization, savings and investment can differ within the
country. This means that, everything else equals, interest rate volatility should fall. We completely
ignore this effect of globalization on the volatility of interest rates and its consequences for the cost
of capital in our analysis.
In a world where barriers to international investment are such that national capital markets
are completely segmented from each other, investors in each country have to bear all the risk of the
economic activities of that country. Investors in a country require a risk premium to bear this risk.
This premium increases with the riskiness of the country’s economic activities. Suppose that investors6
in each country are risk-averse and care only about the expected return of their invested wealth and
the variance of that return. They therefore measure risk by the variance of the return of their
portfolio. Furthermore, to simplify the exposition, we assume that all investors are the same within
each country. In this case, as the return volatility of a country’s market portfolio increases, the risk
premium of the market portfolio, defined as the expected return on the market portfolio minus the
risk-free rate, increases. If investors have the same constant coefficient of relative risk aversion, the
risk premium on the market is the coefficient of relative risk aversion times the variance of the return
on the market portfolio. As a result, a country where the variance of the return on the market
portfolio is twice that in another country has a risk premium that is twice the risk premium of the
other country. 
If a country’s investors only care about the expected return and the volatility of their invested
wealth and that country’s capital market is segmented from other capital markets, the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM) holds for that country. Consequently, when investors evaluate the risk of a
risky security, they do not worry about the risk of that security as a stand-alone security but instead
about how this security contributes to the risk of their portfolio. Since all investors in a country are
assumed to be the same, they hold the same portfolio of risky securities. This portfolio has to be the
market portfolio, namely a portfolio that includes all the risky securities of a country in proportion
to their market value. All investors therefore evaluate the risk of a security in terms of how it
contributes to the risk of the market portfolio of their country. The measure of the contribution of
the risk of a security to the risk of the market portfolio is the security’s beta coefficient. The beta
coefficient of a security is equal to the ratio of the covariance of the return of that security with the
return of the market portfolio divided by the variance of the return of the market portfolio. A security4 Subrahmanyam (1974) provides an analysis of the case where two segmented capital
markets become one market. He shows that wealth does not necessarily increase in each country,
but that welfare necessarily does for the utility functions he considers. 
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that contributes more to the risk of the market portfolio has a higher beta. Since that security is
riskier, it should receive a higher risk premium. With the CAPM, the expected return required by the
market on a risky security is equal to the risk-free rate plus a risk premium equal to the beta
coefficient of the security times the market’s risk premium. When a firm considers whether to take
on a project, the present value of the project for the shareholders is given by the expected cash flows
they will receive from the project discounted at their required rate of return as determined by the
CAPM. A decrease in the market’s risk premium makes all projects whose return has a positive
covariance with the return on the market portfolio more advantageous.  Typically, projects have a
positive covariance with the return on the market portfolio. 
We now consider the impact on the cost of capital for the case where segmented countries
decide to open up their markets to each other.
4 To do so, we take the economic activities of the
various countries as given. In other words, if a country has invested in the production of widgets, the
payoff from that economic activity is assumed to be unchanged by globalization. This means that the
expected value and the variance of the profits from producing widgets are not affected by
globalization. As a country opens up its capital market to foreign investors and lets its residents invest
abroad, the residents of the country no longer have to bear all the risks associated with the economic
activities of the country. Foreign investors, by investing in the country, bear some of these risks. In
exchange, domestic investors, by buying foreign securities, bear some foreign risks. For domestic
investors, the benefit from bearing both domestic and foreign risks rather than only domestic risks is
that some of these risks offset each other through the process of diversification. A country might have8
bad news on one day, but another country might have good news. Because of diversification resulting
from access to global capital markets, domestic investors can construct a portfolio of equities that
has less risk for the same expected return. 
To understand the impact of diversification when countries liberalize their capital markets, it
is useful to consider an example. Assume for the purpose of this example that each country is small,
that there are a large number of countries, that the return on each national market portfolio has the
same expected value and variance, and that the return on the market portfolio in each country is
uncorrelated with the return of the market portfolio in every other country. After all countries become
open to each other, investors who care only about the expected return and the variance of the return
of their portfolio hold the world market portfolio to take maximum advantage of the benefits from
diversification. With our assumptions, the expected return of the invested wealth of an investor does
not depend on how his wealth is invested across countries, but the variance of the return of the
investor’s invested wealth falls with the number of countries in which he invests.  As the investor’s
portfolio becomes more and more diversified across countries, the variance of the return of his wealth
becomes trivial. In the extreme case where the number of countries is extremely large and the return
of the market portfolio of each country is independent of the return of the market portfolio of the
other countries, the world market portfolio would have no risk and hence no risk premium. 
If investors truly care only about the expected return and the variance of the return of their
invested wealth, then when they have additional investment opportunities, they take advantage of
them to hold portfolios that have a higher expected return for the same variance or have a lower
variance for the same expected return. This means that in integrated markets investors hold an
internationally diversified portfolio of risky securities and measure the risk of individual risky9
securities by how they contribute to the variance of the return of their internationally diversified
portfolio. Since all investors are assumed to be the same, they invest their wealth in the same way and
the country they come from is irrelevant. If all investors hold the same portfolio of risky assets, they
have to hold the world market portfolio. As a result, the CAPM holds for all integrated markets
together rather than on a country-by-country basis since investors hold securities from all these
countries. It is useful to think of the equity markets that are integrated with each other as forming
essentially one market which we call the global equity market. This means that the beta coefficient
of a risky security is computed relative to the market portfolio for the global equity market, which
we call the world market portfolio. With our example, if there are enough countries, the volatility of
the world market portfolio becomes zero and consequently the beta of each security becomes zero.
This would mean that the risk premium in each country would fall to zero since no country would
contribute to the risk of the market portfolio.
It is unrealistic to think that all risks could be completely diversifiable internationally. In
particular, business cycles cross country boundaries. Nevertheless, the example where all risks are
diversifiable starkly shows that, in principle, globalization can decrease risk for the world equity
market as a whole and hence reduce each country’s cost of capital by making risks diversifiable that
would not otherwise be diversifiable. 
We now consider the impact of opening up a country’s capital markets on its cost of capital
more generally. Consider a small country whose equity markets are completely segmented from the
equity markets abroad. Since the country is small, adding that country to the world equity markets
does not increase the risk premium on the world market portfolio. Remember that our investors
measure risk by the return variance of their portfolio. They are rewarded for bearing risk by the risk10
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premium. The price per unit of risk is therefore the risk premium divided by the variance of the return.
To eliminate the impact of differences in risk aversion, we assume that all investors in the world have
the same constant relative risk aversion. With this assumption, the price of risk in that country before
its market opens up is a constant which we denote by T. Consequently, the risk premium on the small
country before integration is:
(1)
where   is the small country’s market portfolio return variance. We now consider the risk sSmall country
2
premium after globalization. Remember that after globalization, the small country’s equity market
becomes part of the global equity market. Denote the expected return of the world market portfolio
by E(RWorld). If we write R for the risk-free rate, the risk premium on the world market portfolio is
E(RWorld) - R. The capital asset pricing model holds for the global equity market, so that the risk
premium on a risky asset depends on its beta coefficient with respect to the world market portfolio:
   is the volatility of the return on the world market portfolio,   is the return sWorld sSmall country
volatility of the small country’s market portfolio, and D  is the correlation coefficient between the
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in the world equity markets is T and that all investors in the world are the same. It follows from a
comparison of the risk premium before globalization and after globalization that a necessary and
sufficient condition for globalization to reduce the risk premium of the small country is that:
This condition holds whenever an investor in the small country who has put all his wealth in the
country’s market portfolio can construct a portfolio that has a lower variance of return than the
market portfolio of the small country by selling some of his holdings of the small country market
portfolio and making a positive investment in the world market portfolio. It is possible that this
condition would not hold for a specific country. Figure 1 shows when globalization could increase
the cost of capital of a country. The reason why globalization might increase the cost of capital of a
country is that in global markets, a country’s risk premium depends on the covariance of that
country’s market portfolio return with the return of the world market portfolio. If this covariance is
high, this means that the market portfolio of the country is risky from the perspective of the global
markets. Hence, it is expected to earn a large risk premium which might exceed the risk premium it
would be expected to earn if it was segmented from the global markets. If the return of the market12
portfolio of the small country is uncorrelated with the return of the world market portfolio, then the
small country’s market portfolio is not expected to earn a risk premium when it is integrated in the
global market. Consequently, as long as the correlation between the small country’s market portfolio
return and the return of the world market portfolio is not too high or the volatility of the small
country’s market portfolio is not too low, the small country’s risk premium falls when it joins the
global equity market.
   Figure 2 plots the maximum allowable correlation coefficient between the small country and
the world market for integration to decrease the cost of capital. It is immediately obvious that if the
correlation is negative, globalization always decreases the cost of capital. Though some correlations
are negative, this case does not seem generally relevant. Note, however, that globalization decreases
the cost of capital over a wide range where the correlation is positive provided that the return
volatility of the world market portfolio does not exceed the return volatility of the small country
market portfolio by too much. A case that is generally relevant is the one where the volatility of the
world market portfolio is lower than the volatility of the small country. In this case, irrespective of
the correlation coefficient, globalization necessarily decreases the cost of capital of the small country.
We will see in Section III that when the condition given by equation (3) is applied to a large number
of countries, there is not a single country where a case can be made that globalization increases the
cost of capital. 
We now consider the question of whether a large country that belongs to the global equity
market has a smaller risk premium than if it did not. To answer this question, we have to take into
account the fact that the risk premium of the global equity market depends on whether the country
belongs to that market. With our assumption that all investors are the same and have constant relative5 See Stulz (1995) for an analysis of how to compute the cost of capital of a firm in global
markets. 
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risk aversion, the larger country has a lower risk premium when it belongs to the global market than
when it is segmented from these markets provided that investors in the large country can construct
a lower variance portfolio by taking a long position in the equity of the other countries that belong
to the global market portfolio. In this case, both the larger country and the other countries in the
global market portfolio benefit from belonging to the global equity market.
Our analysis so far has focused on the cost of capital for the country as a whole. If the cost
of capital in a country falls because of globalization, this means that the value-weighted cost of capital
across firms in that country falls as well.
5 It is possible, however, for globalization to decrease the
cost of capital for a country but increase the cost of capital for some firms within that country. Before
globalization, the CAPM holds for the country. Denote the country risk premium before globalization
as  . The risk premium for a firm’s equity before globalization is given by: lSmall country
where  is the beta coefficient of firm i before globalization. This beta coefficient is bi
Small country
therefore the ratio of the covariance between the return of the i-th firm and the return of the small
country market portfolio divided by the variance of the small country market portfolio. After 
globalization, the risk premium of firm i becomes:14
Now, the beta coefficient is computed with respect to the world market portfolio and the risk
premium of the market is the risk premium for the world market portfolio. It is possible for firm i to
have a low beta coefficient with respect to the small country market portfolio and a high beta
coefficient with respect to the world market portfolio. An example of such a situation is the following.
Suppose that firm i is small enough that it does not affect the distribution of the return of the market
portfolio in the small country. Assume that firm i has a low correlation with respect to the small
country market portfolio but a high correlation with respect to the world market portfolio. In this
case, firm i has a low risk premium before globalization but a high risk premium afterwards.
However, when globalization reduces the risk premium of a country’s market portfolio, it must be
the case that the market-value weighted average of the firms’ risk premiums falls. This means that a
firm with a cost of capital increase because of globalization is the exception rather than the rule when
globalization decreases the cost of capital of its country.
In addition to considering the impact of a country’s capital market liberalization on the cost
of capital of firms within the country, it is also important to consider the impact on a firm’s cost of
capital if that firm can access global markets but the other firms in its country cannot. Equation (4)
gives us the firm’s risk premium when it does not have access to the world capital markets. In this
case, the firm’s cost of capital is determined by its local market. When the firm accesses the world
capital markets, its cost of capital is given by world capital markets as shown in equation (5). If a firm
has a low beta with respect to the world market portfolio but a high beta with respect to its local
market, the fall in the cost of capital from globalization is substantial. Suppose that a firm has a beta
of one with respect to its country’s market portfolio and that this country has a risk premium of 20%.
In this case, the firm’s cost of capital is the risk-free rate, assumed to be 5%,  plus 20%. If the firm’s15
risk is diversifiable in global markets, the firm’s equity cost of capital becomes the risk-free rate. In
other words, by accessing world markets this firm experiences a reduction in its cost of capital of
80%. In general, firms will have some non-diversifiable risks in world markets, so that the cost of
capital does not decrease that much.
To obtain the result that globalization decreases the cost of capital under circumstances that
are empirically plausible, we made a number of assumptions. We now consider whether any of these
assumptions are essential for our results. We simplified our analysis by assuming that investors are
similar within and across countries. Such an assumption is important in the following sense. In our
analysis of the small country that becomes global, the country’s cost of capital would obviously
increase if investors in that country are close to risk-neutral while investors in the global equity
market are much more risk-averse. However, it seems unlikely that investors’  risk preferences differ
systematically across countries. One could argue that investors in more developed financial markets
might act as if they are less risk-averse because they have more opportunities to hedge against risks,
but except for this, there is no good reason to suspect that differences in risk-tolerance across
countries are important. We assumed that investors have constant relative risk aversion. This
assumption is not essential to our analysis. The assumption that investors care only about the
expected return and the variance of their portfolio is not essential either. 
Our analysis assumed that the rate of interest is constant as capital market segmentation
changes. Basak (1996) discusses how globalization can increase the rate of interest. To see this,
consider two otherwise similar countries, but one country’s equity market is closed. Keeping the rate
of interest constant, we know that everybody is better off. This implies that investors would want to
consume more now as well as in the future. If the goods available now for consumption are fixed, the6 See Subrahmanyam (1975). Again, however, the work of Basak (1996) shows that the
interest rate increase associated with globalization can decrease a country’s welfare. This only
happens if the country that liberalizes is large in the sense that its actions have a significant impact
on the world interest rate and if this country borrows for current consumption.    
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interest rate has to increase to induce investors to avoid consuming more now. For this interest rate
effect to be important, it has to be that the country that opens up its equity market is large compared
to the world. This assumption is reasonable whenever a small country opens its equity markets. 
By taking the interest rate and the distribution of payoffs to economic activities to be constant,
we ignored how globalization changes economic activities. As Obstfeld (1994) shows, globalization
allows countries to specialize more and undertake riskier projects because individuals in a country
can diversify risks by investing abroad. However, as diversification decreases the cost of capital, it
also increases investment. In the short-run, resources are fixed. An increase in the rate of interest can
make resources available for investment that otherwise would be consumed. Again, though, if the
country whose market opens up is small, there is no reason to think that this will have a noticeable
impact on interest rates in the world. Prices of investment goods can also increase. Since a country’s
stock of investment goods is given at a point in time, the short-term impact of globalization on prices
of investment goods within a country could be significant. Over time, the price impact would fall
because of imports.
In our analysis, we have focused on the impact of globalization on the cost of capital. It is
important to remember that globalization affects welfare as well as the cost of capital. Though the
impact of globalization on the cost of capital is theoretically ambiguous, this is not so for the impact
of globalization on welfare.
6 Consider again our small country. As that country joins the global equity
market, its cost of capital increases or decreases. If the cost of capital of that country increases, the17
value of its market portfolio falls so that globalization makes investors in that country financially
worse off. We saw that this outcome is unlikely, but suppose it did occur. In this case, investors in
the small country get to invest their wealth in the world market portfolio. Because of the benefits
from international diversification, these investors can invest in a portfolio that has the same variance
as the small country market portfolio but has a higher expected return. It turns out that for reasonable
utility functions, investors in the small country who have a choice between having the small country
remain segmented or becoming part of the global equity market, choose globalization because of the
risk-sharing that globalization enables them to achieve even though their wealth falls.  
The fact that globalization leads to better opportunities to share risks for individuals in
different countries implies that even though globalization can decrease wealth in a country or decrease
the value of a firm, the equity value of the augmented global market is always higher than the sum
of the equity values of the countries that joined the global market and the countries that belonged to
that market already. In other words, globalization necessarily increases wealth. This means that it is
always possible to redistribute the wealth increase resulting from globalization so that every investor
benefits. In the language of economists, globalization is Pareto-optimal. Therefore, it can take place
in such a way that everybody is better off and nobody is worse off. 
Section II. Globalization, governance, and financial services.  
The theoretical arguments for why globalization decreases the discount rate of investors are
compelling, but they do not capture the whole impact of globalization on the cost of capital. To
understand this, let’s focus on a firm that has to raise equity to finance investment. In many ways, the
ability of firms to raise equity is a paradox. With an equity issue, the firm receives cash without a7 See Stulz (1990) for more details and references. 
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contractual agreement to give anything back. For equity financing to be possible, shareholders have
to believe that they will receive a cash flow that makes their investment worthwhile. The rate at which
shareholders discount the expected cash flow is the one discussed in Section I. However, the ability
of the firm to raise funds depends crucially on the cash flow shareholders expect to receive. As
discussed in the introduction, managers face difficulties in convincing shareholders that they can
expect to receive a sufficiently high expected cash flow to make it worthwhile to buy the equity.
7 This
is because managers have information that shareholders do not have about the firm’s investments and
can alter projects to benefit them at the expense of shareholders. It is therefore possible for a firm to
have good projects but be unable to finance them because its managers cannot convince shareholders
that these projects are worthwhile. Though we focus first on a firm where managers are in power,
many of the issues that we discuss are the same if a large shareholder is in power instead. We address
the case where a large shareholder is in power next.
Consider the management of a firm that has valuable projects viewed from the perspective of
management. In other words, if management could convince investors that the cash flows that will
accrue to investors are those that management expects, the shareholders would benefit if the firm
were able to invest in these projects. Managers will generally have difficulties convincing investors
of the value of projects because they benefit from investment even if the projects are not as good as
they say. Managers benefit if the firm grows. This leads them to want to invest in marginal projects
if better projects are not available rather than pay out larger dividends. Shareholders can reduce
management’s ability to invest inappropriately by monitoring managers, so that actions by managers
that do not benefit investors are likely to be discovered. Managers will be penalized for taking such19
actions, and steps will be taken to force managers to change them. 
Monitoring is unlikely to be sufficient to ensure that managers maximize firm value for the
investors. Managers also have to have incentives to do so. In general, however, both incentives and
monitoring are required to obtain the best outcome for minority shareholders. There are at least three
reasons why monitoring alone is not sufficient. First, if outsiders could find out and understand
everything managers do and know, there would be no need for managers. Managers are needed
because delegation from the owners of the firm is necessary. Consequently, monitoring is imperfect.
Second, monitoring is expensive. This limits the amount of monitoring. In some cases, monitoring
is so expensive that it does not take place at all. For instance, management may claim that a discovery
has high value, but to verify this claim might be too expensive. Third, because monitoring is imperfect
and expensive, it tends to take place when bad outcomes occur. If the firm loses money, investors will
expend resources to figure out what is happening. It is much harder for outsiders to figure out
whether managers did not take actions that would have made a successful firm even more successful.
Incentives can lead managers to take actions that maximize shareholder wealth even when no
monitoring takes place. Nevertheless, the impact of incentives is limited. Not all managers are equally
good, so that some managers might not benefit much from incentives and would be removed if
monitored. Managers may benefit from disguising poor performance. Also, managers can gain by
taking actions that maintain and increase firm size even if they do not increase the stock price because
their perks depend on firm size. Finally, opportunities for managers to favor friends or large
shareholders can be profitable for them at the expense of minority shareholders. 
Let’s consider how monitoring of management takes place and how it is affected by8 For a recent review of the literature on corporate governance, see Shleifer and Vishny
(1997). 
9 See Easterbrook (1984).
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globalization.
8 We consider in turn the main mechanisms used to monitor management:
1) The board of directors. In principle, a firm’s board of directors is the most direct
monitoring mechanism of management. Managers report to the board and the board can fire
management. Board members have a duty to be informed about what management is doing. The
difficulty with this is that managers generally determine the composition of the board when the firm
has diffuse shareholders. This limits the board’s ability to monitor management. Having a board that
lacks credibility is not an issue for a firm that does not have to raise funds. However, if the firm wants
to raise funds on the capital markets, it becomes an important issue because a weak board is less
likely to correct the actions of managers or replace managers if needed, so that investors expect lower
cash flows from a project if it is undertaken by a firm with a weak board. To access global markets,
investors in these markets have to have confidence that the use of the funds they provide will be
monitored. This will lead to boards that are more independent of management and play a more active
role. 
2) The capital markets. Managers are monitored when they go to capital markets.
9 To sell
securities, managers have to hire investment bankers who play a key certification role. The reputation
of these investment bankers is at stake in the issuance process. To access global markets, firms have
to use investment bankers with a reputation in these markets. This leads to the monitoring of
management by investment bankers who have different skills, information, and incentives. While local
investment bankers might notice some problems in a firm, global investment bankers will generally10 See Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
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notice other problems. A firm trying to access global markets therefore has to pass a hurdle that firms
that only raise funds at home do not have to pass.
3) The legal system. The legal system plays two roles.
10 First, it limits the rights of
management. With a poor legal system, managers can steal from shareholders. As the legal system
improves, this becomes more difficult. Second, the legal system provides a mechanism for investors
to monitor management and exercise their rights. As shareholders discover actions by management
that hurt them, they can use the legal system to force management to rescind such actions. With the
globalization of financial markets, firms from countries with poor protection of minority shareholders
that raise funds and list in countries with better protection of minority shareholders expose themselves
to legal actions from investors in these countries. As a result, minority shareholders are better
protected in these firms. An example of this is the case of Velcro Industries reported by La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999). This firm was incorporated in the Netherlands Antilles
and listed on the Montreal Stock Exchange. Two-thirds of the shares were in the hands of the Cripps
family which tried to reduce the share price by slashing earnings to buy out minority shareholders
cheap. The stock price fell from $30 in 1998 to $12 within a year, but rebounded to $20 in 1990
when the Cripps family made an offer to repurchase minority shares at $21. An American minority
shareholder sued in New York. According to Forbes (May 23, 1994) “When a New York judge ruled
that the U.S. was the proper jurisdiction, secretive Sir Humphrey Cripps decided to call off his offer
rather than go under the light of U.S. court of law.” By 1994, the shares were trading at $57. Besides
leading to greater monitoring of firms that participate in the international markets, globalization also
puts pressure on countries to improve their legal system so that they can better participate in the11 See Jensen and Ruback (1983). 
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global markets. 
4) Active shareholders. Small shareholders have little incentive to monitor management.
Even if monitoring would lead to an improvement in management’s policies that increase firm value,
the benefit to small shareholders would be limited compared to the costs. Large shareholders benefit
much more from monitoring. As a result, the management of a firm with large shareholders is
monitored more closely. The difficulty with the monitoring by large shareholders is that these
shareholders might use their stake to obtain benefits from management that do not accrue to the other
shareholders. The most valuable large shareholders to a corporation are those who have specialized
skills that enable them to give valuable input to management. Globalization makes it possible for
investors from other countries to take large stakes in a firm and monitor management. An example
of active foreign investors is the case of Olivetti, which was the fourth largest public company in Italy
in 1995. It was making huge losses in its PC division. Its Chairman, Carlo de Benedetti, had to raise
funds from international institutional investors in December 1995, giving them a 70% stake in the
company. He promised to solve the problems of the PC division. By September 1996, the new
investors thought he was floundering. The share price was at 726 Lira. They forced de Benedetti out
and eventually forced the company to divest its losing assets. By the time of the announcement of the
last major divestiture at the beginning of 1998, the share price was at 1,958 Lira, having more than
doubled (New York Times, March 3, 1998). 
5) The market for corporate control.  Ultimately, the market for corporate control makes
it possible to remove management if it does not maximize shareholder wealth.
11 If firms can be taken
over, investors can make large profits by acquiring information about possible targets. This leads to23
monitoring of management even if no takeover takes place since management knows that if it
performs poorly, it could become a takeover target. Opening up a capital market to foreign investors
immediately creates a much larger pool of investors that can compete for control of firms within that
market. This leads to greater competition for control which benefits existing shareholders directly.
6) Disclosure. Disclosure of information by firms is required by laws and regulations.
However, firms would disclose information even if they were not required to do so. This is because
otherwise they would face difficulties raising funds from the public capital markets and would be able
to raise funds only from financial intermediaries. When a firm raises funds from a financial
intermediary, it can provide information directly to the financial intermediary, so that public
disclosures can be replaced by private disclosures. When a firm raises funds from public markets, it
has to provide information more readily. However, in addition, investors are concerned about the
availability of information in the future. With greater disclosure, it becomes less costly to monitor
management since it has to give more information about its performance. The problem is that it is
difficult for a firm to commit to disclosure. The choice of a regulatory environment is a mechanism
for firms to commit to disclosure, as is the listing on an exchange. Through globalization, firms can
commit to higher disclosure standards by seeking additional listings on exchanges that have higher
standards than their local market. Firms benefit from this greater disclosure if it reveals that they have
the good prospects their management believes that they have. Since only firms whose management
expects to benefit from greater disclosure list on stricter exchanges, the announcement that a firm will
list on a stricter exchange is good news. Cantale (1998) and Fuerst (1998) develop theoretical models12 See also Huddard, Hughes, and Brunnermeister (1998) for an analysis that focuses on
the how the competition among exchanges for trading volume impacts disclosure requirements.
They argue that this competition leads to a race to the top rather than to the bottom in terms of
disclosure requirements.
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where firms reveal their good prospects by listing abroad.
12
In this analysis, globalization increases the monitoring of management and hence increases
firm value. Yet, based on our analysis, one might conclude that globalization increases the monitoring
of management only for those firms that decide to participate in the global capital markets. This is not
the case, however. Once a firm has a choice between participating in global capital markets and not
participating, it reveals information about itself if it does not participate. To see this, consider the case
of disclosure. Firms that want to participate in global markets have to meet disclosure standards that
allow them to compete for funds on these markets. If a firm does not decide to meet such disclosure
standards, investors can only conclude that the firm does not do so because adhering to such
standards would reveal adverse information about the firm. Consequently, firms that stay local and
keep adhering to poorer disclosure standards reveal themselves as firms that are worth less than
previously thought. Viewed this way, globalization puts pressure on all firms through greater
monitoring of management. 
Our discussion has focused on the case where management is in control. One would generally
view such a situation as typical in the U.S. and the U.K. As Laporta, Lopez-Silanes and Shleifer
(1999) show, however, such a situation is not typical in many other countries. They demonstrate that
outside of the U.S. and the U.K. a more typical situation is one where a large shareholder controls
the firm. We saw earlier in this section that large shareholders have greater incentives to monitor
management. However, large shareholders also have greater incentives to force management to take13 In Cantale (1998), managers have private benefits from control that become smaller
when they list on a stricter exchange because of the greater scrutiny. Coffee (1999) provides an
analysis of the legal implications of a U.S. listing for a foreign firm and how minority shareholders
benefit from such a listing. 
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actions that benefit them at the expense of other shareholders and other investors. This creates a
problem for firms in accessing capital markets. For instance, investors who buy equity in a firm
controlled by a large shareholder will discount the price they are willing to pay to reflect the fact that
the firm’s profits might be siphoned off to companies controlled by the large shareholder. This
discount might be large enough that the firm effectively cannot raise new funds. Further, should it
raise new funds, the large shareholders would lose money if they did not siphon off profits since they
sold equity at a price that reflects this dilution. To avoid this problem, minority shareholders have to
be protected. Rather than monitoring management, these shareholders want to monitor the large
shareholder. They can do so using the mechanisms discussed above except for the board of directors,
since the large shareholder will control the board of directors. By listing on exchanges with high
standards for minority shareholder protection, a firm commits to respecting the rights of these
shareholders. To the extent that the local exchange does not have such high standards, globalization
enables firms to seek listings on foreign exchanges which have high standards, thereby increasing firm
value by insuring that the firm’s policies are more likely to increase shareholder wealth and by making
it easier for the firm to raise funds. The same argument can be made for listing in countries with
strong minority shareholder rights to the extent that shareholders from these countries benefit from
these rights when they buy foreign shares.
13    
In the analysis of Section I, we ignored the costs of buying and selling securities. Globalization
affects these costs for a firm and this impact increases firm value directly and indirectly. Amihud and26
Mendelson (1986) among others show that the bid-ask spread affects the market’s required rate of
return on securities. The reasoning is that if investors have to pay more to transact a security, they
have to be compensated with a greater expected return before transaction costs to offset these costs.
With globalization, one expects the bid-ask spread on securities to decrease for several reasons. First,
directly related to our analysis of governance, the greater disclosure associated with globalization at
the firm level directly implies that there are fewer valuable opportunities for insider trading. This
means that investors and market makers who do not have access to inside information worry less
about being taken advantage of by insiders when they trade, so that more investors and market
makers are willing to transact in a firm’s securities. This leads to greater liquidity and a lower bid-ask
spread. Evidence on the link between disclosure and the cost of capital is provided by Botosan
(1997). She shows empirically for the U.S. that firms with limited analyst following that disclose more
have a lower cost of capital. Smith and Sofianos (1997) show that firms that list abroad experience
an increase in volume, even on their home market, which is consistent with the argument that
globalization leads to greater liquidity and hence a lower cost of capital. Second, globalization means
greater competition in market-making and investment banking services. Firms that enter the global
capital markets have access to investment banks that can compete for their business and hence lower
prices.  These firms can also choose to list on exchanges that are more efficient, thereby reducing the
cost of transacting their securities. 
The greater liquidity that results from globalization has an indirect impact on the monitoring
of management. First, with greater liquidity, the market for a firm’s equity becomes more efficient
in that it better reflects information about the firm. This makes the firm’s stock price more informative
and hence more useful in monitoring management. Second, greater liquidity makes it easier for14 See Diamond (1984) for an early analysis of this point. 
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investors to accumulate positions in a stock and to sell these positions as well. Bhide (1993) argues
that greater liquidity generally means less monitoring of management since shareholders can sell their
shares if they do not agree with management’s policies easily. The argument is that in a liquid market
shareholders who do not agree with management’s policies can sell their shares rather than try to
convince management to adopt different policies. Maug (1998) points out, however, that liquidity is
essential for large shareholders to build positions. Hence, with liquid markets, investors who want
the firm to change its policies or who want to acquire the firm can do so. 
Access to global financial markets enables firms to take advantage of greater competition for
investment banking services. This allows them to save costs when they issue new securities. However,
it also allows them to access different types of services and products. In particular, it enables them
to take advantage of new financial technologies and new financial products. To develop new financial
technologies and new financial products, investment banks generally require economies of scale that
are present in large financial centers but not available in smaller ones. For instance, these firms
develop expertise in financial products and techniques used to manage risks. Access to such products
and techniques enables firms to reduce their risk. A direct consequence of better risk management
is that it becomes easier to evaluate management.
14 This is because risk management allows the firm
to make adverse developments that do not result from management’s actions less likely, so that if
adverse developments occur, they are more likely to result from managerial mistakes. 
One way to capture the impact of globalization on the cost of capital is as follows. We can
divide total firm value into three pieces. The first piece is the present value of the cash flows that
accrue to the capital providers who do not receive benefits from control. The second piece consists15 There is a growing empirical literature that evaluates these benefits from control across
countries. See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for references. These benefits can be substantial as
evidenced by Zingales (1994) in the case of Italy. 
16 See Kang, Kim, Park, and Stulz (1995). 
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of  the value of the benefits from control.
15 When management is in charge, it gets to take actions that
benefit management instead of benefitting shareholders. Large shareholders get these benefits when
they control the firm. The third piece corresponds to the deadweight costs resulting from the agency
costs and information asymmetries that lead to benefits from control. With our analysis, globalization
increases the present value of the cash flows that accrue to the capital providers both by decreasing
the discount rate of these cash flows for the reasons discussed in Section I and by increasing the cash
flows they receive. The cash flows shareholders receive increase because globalization enables firms
to finance valuable projects, decreases the benefits from control, and  decreases the deadweight costs
resulting from agency costs and information asymmetries.
It is not the case, however, that all effects of globalization necessarily increase the monitoring
of management in the short-run. The reason for this is that globalization can disrupt existing
relationships within a country that led to the monitoring of management or large shareholders. For
instance, consider the case of Japan. In the Japanese economy, monitoring historically took place
primarily through banks and through the keiretsu. Banks held equity stakes in their customers and
played a much more active role in the financing and the governance of firms than would be the case
in U.S. banks. As a result, Japan was viewed as having a bank-centered governance system. Such a
system was contrasted with the U.S. system, where the market for corporate control has a central role
in the monitoring of managers. Globalization had a dramatic impact on the financing and the
governance of Japanese firms: it enabled firms to raise funds outside of Japan.
16 Firms found that17 See Rosenbluth (1989) for an analysis of the impact of foreign competition on
regulation in Japan.
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doing this was cheaper because of competition among investment banks that did not exist within
Japan. This weakened domestic banks and forced them to reduce their fees for issuing securities.
Further, to keep issuing securities at home, these banks were forced to relax issuing standards on the
domestic public debt market. Before 1980, Japanese firms could not raise debt on public markets
because of informal and formal restrictions. This benefitted banks since firms had to use banks to
obtain debt finance. As competition from foreign markets increased, the standards that firms had to
meet to issue public debt in Japan were lowered, so that by the 1990s almost all firms were eligible
to issue public debt.
17 Because of globalization, Japanese banks lost much of their power in that their
client firms became able to raise funds publicly. A bank can monitor management only to the extent
that it can threaten to withhold funds. This threat weakened in Japan as a result of globalization.
Unfortunately, at least in the short-run, Japanese firms continued to be controlled by Japanese
corporate shareholders, so that the benefits of globalization in terms of a larger pool of active
shareholders and potential bidders could not manifest itself. In the case of Japan, therefore,
globalization in the short-run reduced the power of banks, but did not replace that power by the
power of the market. At the same time, however, it is becoming clear that firms have to change
because of globalization and that some firms are evolving toward Western-style corporate governance
where more attention is paid to stock prices.
Section III. The empirical evidence on the impact of globalization on the cost of capital.
We saw in the previous section that globalization decreases a country’s cost of capital as long18 See Errunza and Losq (1985), Eun and Janakiramanan (1986), and Stulz (1981). 
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as the investors of that country can create a portfolio that has a lower variance by making positive
investments in other countries. In this section, we examine the empirical evidence of the impact of
globalization on the cost of capital. We examine this issue in three steps. First, we discuss the
problems of traditional approaches of estimating the risk premium using time-series data to evaluate
the impact of globalization on the cost of capital. Second, we discuss indirect approaches to assess
the impact of capital market liberalizations on the cost of capital.  Finding that these indirect
approaches generally detect a significant but small impact of globalization on the cost of capital at
the country as well as at the firm level, we then address the issue in the last part of this section of why
the measured impact is not higher. 
A. Globalization, the CAPM, and a simple test of whether globalization reduces the cost of
capital. 
In the analysis of Section I, we assumed that investors only care about the expected return
of their portfolio and the variance of that return. We further assumed that a market was either
completely segmented from the other markets or fully integrated in the global markets. With these
assumptions, the CAPM holds where the market portfolio is the value-weighted portfolio of all
securities that investors have access to. The analysis becomes substantially more complicated if we
allow for cases where investors in a country face some barriers to international investment, but these
barriers are not such that the country is completely segmented.
18 The analysis of Section I raises two
questions. First, does the CAPM hold among the countries whose markets are integrated? Second,
is it generally the case that the condition we derived in Section I according to which globalization19 See Adler and Dumas (1981) for a review and analysis of these issues. 
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lowers the cost of capital holds? We answer these two questions in this section.
Tests of the CAPM in an international setting have been conducted in two ways. First, there
have been tests of the CAPM using country portfolios. These tests have been surprisingly supportive
of versions of the CAPM that allow for a time-varying risk premium. In particular, Harvey (1991)
provides evidence that is consistent with the CAPM holding internationally using a large number of
countries. He finds, however, that the return of the Japanese portfolio is inconsistent with the CAPM
over his sample period because of the extremely large return of Japanese stocks in the 1980s. Using
a different approach, DeSantis and Gerard (1997) also find results supportive of the international
CAPM. Chan, Karolyi and Stulz (1992) conduct a study where they consider the U.S., Japanese and
the Morgan Stanley Europe, Asia and Far East indices. In that study, they find evidence supportive
of the CAPM as well. They show that the risk premium on the U.S. portfolio depends on the
covariance of the return of that portfolio with the return on the foreign index. In other words, the risk
premium on the U.S. market portfolio depends on how the U.S. portfolio is correlated with foreign
stocks. One would expect such a result if the CAPM holds for Japan and the U.S. jointly since in this
case the beta of the U.S. market portfolio with the world market portfolio would depend on its
covariance with the return of the Japanese portfolio. 
Throughout this paper, we have ignored foreign exchange and the peculiar problems it can
create when considering the pricing of risky assets.
19 The issue that arises is that foreign exchange rate
risk can be priced. If it is not priced, investors choose to have no foreign exchange exposures. The
difficulty with this is that investors long in a foreign stock have to short that currency to eliminate the
foreign exchange rate risk. This requires domestic investors to be long the currency. In equilibrium,32
the long holdings of domestic investors have to equal the short holdings of foreign investors. The risk
premium on foreign exchange exposure makes this equilibrium possible. Dumas and Solnik (1995)
provide evidence supportive of the view that exchange rate risk affects the pricing of risky assets. 
Though the CAPM fares well when a study examines country portfolios, it fares less well
when a study focuses on pricing portfolios of stocks within countries as well as across countries. The
difficulty that arises then is that the problems the CAPM faces when used in one country obviously
do not disappear when one studies a number of countries. This means that the anomalies that are
inconsistent with the CAPM within one country, such as the size effect and the book-to-market effect
are present across countries. For instance, Korajczyk and Viallet (1989) show that a world CAPM
understates the expected returns of small firms across countries. Fama and French (1998) show that
value stocks earn a premium across countries and make the case for a world value factor. 
The evidence on the CAPM shows clearly, however, that countries that are integrated in
world markets have a risk premium that depends on their covariances with the world market
portfolio. This is the key intuition of the CAPM on which we relied in Section I to argue that
globalization decreases the cost of capital. We saw that this intuition led to the condition that the cost
of capital of a country is lower if it is part of the global capital market than if it is segmented from it
as long as the variance of the return of the market portfolio of that country is greater than the
covariance of the return of that country with the world market portfolio. Table I provides evidence
on that condition for 37 countries for a ten-year period ending on October 28, 1998. As is evidenced
in the table, there is not a single country where the condition for a decrease in the cost of capital is
not met. It is  important to note, however, that we derived our condition under the assumption that33
differences in relative risk aversion across countries can be ignored and that the distribution of the
return of the world market portfolio is given.
B. Time-series evidence.  
The traditional approach to evaluating the risk premium on a market consists of computing
the average excess return on the market over a long period of time. For instance, it is common in the
U.S. to use past excess returns on the U.S. stock market since the 1920s. The argument for
proceeding this way is the presumption that the future is likely to be similar to the past. One has to
use long periods of time because the stock market is volatile. Over shorter periods of time, one might
conclude that the risk premium is either negative because the market fell, or extremely high because
the market increased dramatically. For instance, if one uses rolling twenty year periods to estimate
the risk premium, one would conclude that the risk premium increased recently. From 1976 to 1995,
the estimate of the risk premium for the U.S. using the Ibbotson data is 7.31%, but from 1978 to
1997 it is 9.36%. 
A market’s capitalization is the present value of the cash flows shareholders will receive from
the securities traded in that market, where the discount rate is the one computed using the risk
premium of the market. This implies that if the cash flows shareholders expect remain unchanged but
the risk premium falls, the market experiences high returns because its capitalization increases. This
negative relation between equity values and the risk premium makes it harder to estimate the risk
premium using historical data. Consequently, in periods when the risk premium is falling, equity
values increase, so that one might conclude, based on equity returns, that the risk premium is high.
Alternatively, if the risk premium is increasing during a period, stock returns are lower than they20 See Abel (1991).
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would be with a constant risk premium and one might conclude that the risk premium is falling. 
Using past returns to estimate the risk premium is a good approach when one believes that
the risk premium is relatively stable over time. In this case, the longer the period over which one
estimates the risk premium, the better the estimate one obtains. Unfortunately, the variance of stock
returns is high enough that one reaches different conclusions about the size of the risk premium
depending on the estimation period even when one uses fairly long periods of time. For instance, the
U.S. risk premium estimated over the last seventy years is substantially higher than the U.S. risk
premium estimated over the last two hundred years. Economists have spent a tremendous amount of
effort trying to understand why the risk premium on U.S. equity is as high as it is, arguing that the
degree of risk-aversion of individuals consistent with the size of the U.S. risk premium is too high to
make sense.
20 However, this problem is much more substantial if one looks at the risk premium over
the last seventy years than if one looks at the risk premium over the last two hundred years. 
There is little reason to believe, however, that the risk premium is stable over long periods
of time. From our discussion in the previous section, we know that there are good reasons for the risk
premium to be related to the variance of returns. This variance changes over time. The market
portfolio changes over time as well. In segmented markets, the relevant market portfolio to estimate
the risk premium is the market portfolio of a country. Consequently, if the U.S. forms a closed
market, the risk premium that is relevant for the U.S. depends on the variance of the U.S. market
portfolio. In integrated markets, the world market risk premium depends on the variance of the world
market portfolio. With constant relative risk aversion, the world market risk premium is a constant
fraction of the world market return variance. As markets become more integrated because barriers35
to international investment fall, more countries become part of the world market portfolio. 
As the world market portfolio includes more countries, one expects its variance to fall because
of the benefits of international diversification. However, this depends partly on the variance of the
countries that are added to the world market portfolio and on the correlation of these countries with
the existing world market portfolio as we saw in the previous section.  Figure 3 shows how adding
a country to the world market portfolio affects the volatility of the return of that portfolio (its
standard deviation), assuming that the world market portfolio volatility is 15% before the new
country is added. We see that the world market portfolio volatility falls as long as the correlation
between the market portfolio and the new country is not too high. If the return of the new country
has a positive correlation with the return of the world market portfolio, adding the new country
increases the volatility of the world market portfolio if the volatility of the added country is high
enough.  
Figure 4 shows a plot of the volatility of the world market portfolio since the 1970s. Several
important lessons can be obtained for this plot. First, volatility is volatile. This makes it difficult to
use volatility to draw inferences about the evolution of the risk premium. Second, the plot shows two
periods of relatively low volatility, namely the 1970s and the 1990s. The market portfolio of the
1970s is essentially a market portfolio of developed economies while the market portfolio of the
1990s also includes emerging markets. Consequently, this is consistent with the view that the risk of
emerging markets is largely diversifiable in the world market portfolio and that volatility was low
among the developed markets. It turns out that during the 1990s, the volatility of the S&P500 is only
slightly higher than the volatility of the world market portfolio. The problem is therefore to explain
why volatility would have been low in general during that period of time. Greater risk-sharing and21Interestingly, Pastor and Stambaugh (1998) examine the risk premium using econometric
techniques that allow for structural breaks and identify a decrease in the cost of capital in the early
1990s.
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participation in equity markets can lead to lower volatility. Unfortunately, we have neither good
models nor empirical evidence on this issue. Third, with constant relative risk aversion, one would
expect  a decrease in the cost of capital during the 1990s because of the lower volatility.
21
Globalization has taken place over the last forty years, so that if the theoretical analysis about
the impact of globalization on the cost of capital is right, one would expect that the cost of capital
decreased over the last forty years. Since, using the time-series average of the risk premium, one
needs long periods of time to estimate the cost of capital, it is hopeless to estimate the impact of
globalization on the cost of capital with an approach that uses time-series averages. One possible
solution is to use an explicit model of the determinants of the risk premium that allows for the impact
of globalization. As of now, this approach has not been followed. Consequently, we lack research that
uses the time-series of stock returns to identify the impact of globalization on the risk premium.
C. Event-study approaches.
We saw that it is difficult to evaluate the impact of globalization on the cost of capital using
the traditional approach of estimating the mean excess return on the market because this approach
requires a long period of time where one expects the cost of capital to be constant. Stock prices are,
everything else equal, negatively related to the cost of capital. Consequently, an unexpected decrease
in barriers to international investment in a country should lead to an unexpected increase in stock
prices. This suggests that one might be able to find out the impact of globalization on the cost of
capital by investigating the impact of globalization events on the equity capitalization of firms and37
countries. 
In corporate finance, it is common to investigate the impact of corporate events on equity by
estimating the return of firms over the day or days that event takes place. For instance, such an
approach is used to estimate the impact of equity issues on firm value. If markets incorporate
information into prices efficiently, all the information contained in an equity issue should affect firm
value immediately. Consequently, studies that evaluate the impact of equity issues do so by focusing
on the stock return of the issuing firm on the day that the issue is announced or even, in some cases,
on the minutes around the time that the issue is announced. When a firm announces an equity issue,
the impact of the announcement on the firm’s equity is affected by idiosyncratic characteristics of the
firm and of the announcement. Hence, focusing on the announcement for an individual firm does not
produce a reliable estimate of the impact of equity issues for a firm. However, if we look at the
average impact of equity issues across a large number of firms, one expects that the idiosyncratic
characteristics of each issuing firm and each issue average out in the sample. This approach to
estimating the impact of corporate events is called an event study. 
If equity markets incorporate information efficiently, one expects that events that lead
investors to believe that an equity market will be more open to foreign investors and that investors
in a country will be better able to invest abroad should have an immediate impact on equity value. In
other words, events that lead investors to believe that a country will become better integrated in a
world market directly affect equity prices in that country. Hence, one can apply the methodology of
event studies to globalization events. 
Henry (1998) provides an event study that investigates the stock market impact of capital
market liberalizations. He uses a sample of 12 countries that liberalize. In his first test, he considers38








the impact of liberalization on a period that starts four months before the announcement and ends
three months after the announcement. Over that period, stock returns are higher by 4.6% per month
on average, for a total cumulative abnormal return of 36.8%. He then proceeds to investigate whether
this impact of globalization still holds when he controls for various variables that influence stock
returns, in particular macroeconomic variables. As a result, the impact of liberalization falls
somewhat, to about 30%, but the impact is still statistically as well as economically significant. His
evidence therefore shows that liberalization increases wealth substantially. 
What does an increase in stock prices of 30% imply for the cost of capital? The value of
equity is the present value of cash flows that will accrue to the shareholders. We can therefore
consider the following experiment that produces an estimate of the impact of globalization on the cost
of capital for the countries of Henry’s sample. A simple valuation model in corporate finance is
Gordon’s growth model. This model assumes that cash flows to shareholders correspond to dividends
and that dividends have a constant growth rate. The model then uses a perpetuity formula to value
the future dividends. With this model, the value of equity is equal to d/(r-B), where d is the dividend
payment at the end of the period, r is the cost of capital and B is the growth rate of dividends.
Suppose one takes d and B as given. In this case, we can reverse-engineer the impact on the cost of
capital from liberalization from the price change:
With Henry’s study, we have the price change in percentage terms, which we define as ). We can
solve the above equation to obtain:39
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We can use this equation to obtain the cost of capital impact. If the cost of capital before
liberalization is 20% and the growth rate of dividends is 5%, the cost of capital falls to 16.5% if the
percentage change in the equity capitalization is 30%. Figure 5 shows that the impact of liberalization
on the cost of capital assuming a percentage change in the equity capitalization of 30% is mostly
driven by the cost of capital before liberalization. The greater the cost of capital before liberalization,
the larger the fall in the cost of capital that results from liberalization. This is because the weight of
the growth of dividends in equation (7) is less than the weight of the cost of capital before the
liberalization as long as the percentage price increase is less than 100%.  
The estimate for the fall in the cost of capital obtained from Henry’s study has to be
interpreted with some caution. First, we keep the growth rate of dividends constant as liberalization
takes place. One would expect liberalization to lead to higher growth and hence a higher growth rate
of dividends. This effect would therefore lead to a lower estimate of the change in the cost of capital.
Second, to the extent that countries liberalize after their stock market has done well, Henry’s estimate
could overstate the magnitude of the gain from liberalization. Third, Henry does not include all
liberalization events, which might understate the total impact of liberalization. Fourth, the approach
suffers from the problem that the sample of liberalization events is small, so that the assumptions
generally required for event studies do not hold and one cannot be confident that the results are not
affected by idiosyncratic noise in country returns.
Bekaert and Harvey (1998) have an alternative approach to estimate the change in the cost40
Dividend yield after  -  Dividend yield before
  =  r  r After  Before -
(8)
of capital from liberalizations. To understand this approach, suppose that the Gordon growth model
holds, so that the value of a firm is d/(r-B). The dividend yield is the ratio of the dividend to the equity
capitalization. Consequently, if the Gordon growth model holds, the dividend yield is d/[d/(r-B)], or
r-B. If the dividend growth model holds and if the expected rate of growth of dividends is constant
as liberalization takes place, then the change in the dividend yield following a liberalization
corresponds exactly to the change in the cost of capital:
Bekaert and Harvey exploit this result to estimate the impact of liberalization on the cost of capital.
To do this, they use a sample of twenty emerging markets. They focus mostly on two types of
liberalization events, the creation of a country fund and the initiation of the first ADR program by a
firm in the country. With both of these events, securities in a country become available to foreign
investors. 
Ideally, if the Gordon growth model holds and the cost of capital is constant both before and
after liberalization, all one would need to do to find out the change in the cost of capital due to the
liberalization is to subtract the dividend yield after the liberalization from the dividend yield before
the liberalization. There are several problems with such an approach. First, expected returns are not
constant. Hence, the dividend yield might increase because expected returns increase even though the
liberalization lowers the dividend yield. Second, data are noisy and the valuation model need not be
correct for every stock price. As a result, the dividend yield at a point in time after liberalization might
not be a good estimate of the dividend after liberalization because of noisy stock prices. Third, there41
are often multiple liberalization events. These difficulties require the use of a regression model that
captures changes in the average dividend yield. Bekaert and Harvey use a sophisticated regression
model where they allow a number of control variables to affect the dividend yield. With this model,
they then estimate the impact of liberalization on the dividend yield. They find that liberalization
decreases the dividend yield, which implies that it decreases the cost of capital. Their estimates of the
impact are small. For ADR introductions, they find an impact that ranges from five basis points to 14
basis points. None of these impacts is significant. For country fund introductions, their estimates
range from 16 to 57 basis points. All these estimates are significant. Depending on the specification
they use, the authors find the impact of liberalization decreases the dividend yield from five to 90
basis points. 
The Bekaert and Harvey study provides evidence of a decrease in the cost of capital following
liberalization, but their estimated effects are small. These estimates rely on important assumptions.
First, the estimates require a valuation model. Though the Gordon model itself is not necessarily
required, models that more explicitly allow for a role of uncertainty in valuation generally make the
equity capitalization depend on other variables that might be affected by liberalization. Second, the
dividend yield growth as well as the payout ratio are likely to be affected by liberalization. An increase
in the dividend growth rate would lead to an overestimate of the cost of capital after liberalization.
Third, it is difficult to date liberalization. To the extent that liberalization dates are measured
imprecisely, this problem biases the coefficient estimate for the impact of liberalization. Fourth, some
variables that the authors control for are likely to be proxies for the degree of liberalization, which
could lead to further bias.
If none of the firms in a country have access to international capital markets, the initiation of42
an ADR program by a firm in that country is evidence of liberalization of the capital market of that
country.  The early ADR initiations in a country are therefore viewed as liberalization events. As a
firm in a country undertakes an ADR program, the cost of capital of the whole country can be
affected if the introduction of the ADR program is viewed as evidence of liberalization for the
country. Nevertheless, one would expect the primary impact of the initiation of an ADR program to
be on the cost of capital of the firm that undertakes such a program. As a result, there has been a
large number of studies that investigate the stock-price impact of ADR introductions. Karolyi (1998)
provides a detailed review of these studies. 
From our earlier analysis, we would expect that a firm that succeeds in having its equity
valued at the global market cost of capital rather than the cost of capital of a segmented market would
typically experience a substantial increase in value. As an example, suppose that the risk premium of
the country is 20%, the firm has a beta with respect to the country market portfolio of one, the
growth of dividends is 4%, and the risk-free rate is 5%. Suppose that the risk of the firm is
diversifiable in world markets, so that the firm has a world beta of zero. In this case, if the firm gets
to unexpectedly access the world markets, its value would increase by a dramatic 2,000%! Yet,
empirical studies have not found evidence of large increases in firm value by focusing on a narrow
window around the announcement of the ADR program or the listing of the ADRs. Perhaps even
more puzzling, there is not complete agreement across studies on even the sign of the impact on firm
value of the initiation of an ADR program. Recent studies have larger samples and more precise
dating than earlier studies. Further, while earlier studies typically used monthly returns, some of the
more recent studies use daily returns. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and Miller (1998) investigate both
the return around the announcement of an ADR program and the return around the day when the43
actual listing takes place. They find positive returns both around the announcement date and around
the listing date. However, these returns are small. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) examine 153 ADR
listings on NASDAQ, AMEX, and NYSE from 1976 to 1992. They find an abnormal return during
the listing week of 1.2%. For 45 listings, they also have an announcement date. For the announcement
date, they find an insignificant positive abnormal return of 0.2%. Miller (1998) finds an average
announcement abnormal return of 1.04% for a sample of 125 announcements from 1985 to 1995.
Miller’s sample includes all ADRs, including Level I and Rule 144a. In his study, the average
announcement abnormal return for the 53 ADRs listed on NYSE or NASDAQ is 2.63%. He
differentiates between firms from emerging markets and firms from developed markets. To the extent
that emerging markets have more barriers to international investment than developed markets, one
would expect a greater abnormal return for firms from emerging markets. He finds an announcement
return of 1.54% for firms from emerging markets and of 0.87% for firms from developed markets.
The difference between the two is not significant, however. 
Even though Miller (1998) interprets his evidence from the perspective that listing shares on
a foreign market relaxes barriers to international investment, it is important to note that his evidence
is fully supportive of models such as those of Cantale (1998) and Fuerst (1998) that demonstrate that
management signals its quality by listing on stricter exchanges and that listing on stricter exchanges
increases shareholder wealth because it reduces private benefits from control. From this perspective,
one would expect a larger stock-price reaction for listings on stricter exchanges and a larger stock-
price reaction for firms coming from environments with looser disclosure standards and less
protection of minority shareholders. This suggests higher abnormal returns for listing on the NYSE
than for listing on other exchanges or NASDAQ and higher abnormal returns for firms listing from22 See Dharan and Ikenberry (1995).  
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emerging markets where protection of minority shareholders is weaker than in other markets. This
is exactly what Miller (1998) finds. Cantale (1998) investigates the stock-price reaction to the
announcement that a firm from continental Europe or the UK intends to list on the NYSE, the
London Stock Exchange, or the Paris Stock Exchange. He argues that the disclosure requirements
are strictest on the NYSE, followed by the London Stock Exchange and the Paris Stock Exchange.
He finds that 34 continental European firms listing on the NYSE experience an average abnormal
return of  3.7%; 46 continental European firms listing on the London Stock Exchange have an
average abnormal return of  2.14%; finally, 22 continental European firms listing on the Paris Stock
Exchange experience an abnormal return of 1.15%. All abnormal returns are significant and
significantly different from each other. 
Both Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and Errunza and Miller (1998) estimate returns before and
after the initiation of an ADR program. Strikingly, Foerster and Karolyi find that firms that list
experience an unexpected increase in their stock price of 19% for the year before the listing. This
unexpected increase is followed, however, by an unexpected decrease of 14% in the year after listing.
It is interesting to note that lower returns after listing have been documented before in the domestic
context, so that low returns after listing in the case of Foerster and Karolyi (1999) may have nothing
to do with the fact that the listing is an ADR listing but may have everything to do with the fact that
firms list following exceptional performance.
22  Errunza and Miller (1998) report an unexpected
increase in the stock price of 8.06% for the six months preceding the announcement. For the six
months following the announcement month, they find that their sample firms outperform by 2.28%
comparable firms that do not announce an ADR program, but this result is not significant. In contrast45
to Foerster and Karolyi, Errunza and Miller look at longer periods before and after the announcement
month. They look at a period that goes from the 36 months before the announcement to seven months
before the announcement. For that period, they report an abnormal return of 34.39% for the firms
that start an ADR program compared to firms in the same country of similar size that do not. They
then look at a period that goes from seven months after the announcement to 36 months after the
announcement. For that period, they find an abnormal return of -3.10% that is not significant. Errunza
and Miller interpret the lower returns of firms in the period that follows the ADR introduction relative
to the period before the ADR introduction as evidence of a decrease in the cost of capital. The
problem with this interpretation is that the direct prediction of the theory is that the firms with an
ADR program should have a lower return than the firms that do not have such a program. Their study
does not make it possible to say much on this issue. Their estimate of -3.10% corresponds to a lower
cost of capital of 127 basis points per year if it can be used as an estimate of the difference in the cost
of capital between firms with ADR programs and without ADR programs. This difference in cost of
capital is not statistically significant. Errunza and Miller also use the dividend yield approach of
Bekaert and Harvey. Using this approach, they find a drop of the dividend yield of 66 basis points.
This drop is not statistically significant. They show, however, that the dividend yield falls more for
firms that provide more diversification for U.S. investors. 
Listing an ADR changes the exposure of a firm to its own country market index and to the
U.S. market index. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) show that a firm that lists an ADR experiences a clear
decrease in its exposure to its own market and a less convincing increase in its exposure to the U.S.
market. Karolyi (1998) uses a model where the risk premium of a firm’s equity is its local beta times
the local market risk premium plus its U.S. beta times the U.S. market risk premium. With such a46
model, taking into account the beta changes that accompany an ADR listing, he finds that on average
the cost of capital declines by 114 basis points for the sample of firms in Foerster and Karolyi (1999)
which mostly contains firms from developed markets. Surprisingly, Urias (1996) finds, using a similar
approach, that firms that access global markets from some emerging markets actually experience an
increase in the cost of capital. 
In Section II, we argued that an important implication of access to global markets is greater
liquidity. A number of studies have documented that the effects discussed there take place. Foerster
and Karolyi (1996) examine post-listing volume, quotes and prices for a sample of 52 Canadian
stocks that list on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ from 1981 to 1990. They find that volume
increases as a result. They also find that spreads and liquidity decrease. Domowitz, Glen and
Madhavan (1998) show evidence of greater competition for order flow in the case of Mexican ADRs.
Using a large sample, Smith and Sofianos (1997) find that firms that access global markets experience
an increase in volume on their home market as well as on the market that they access. All this
evidence shows that listing abroad increases liquidity. It is important to note, however, that listing
on a foreign exchange can affect liquidity for reasons other than those discussed in Section II. In
particular, listing in New York means that trading shares becomes possible for a longer period of time
if the home market of the firm has different trading hours. This means that investors can sell shares
more easily if they unexpectedly need cash outside the trading hours of the home market. This makes
shares more attractive. 
At the firm level, it is possible to conduct an analysis that directly compares the valuation of
firms that have ADR programs and firms that do not. In other words, using known valuation ratios,
one can find out whether ADR firms are valued more than non-ADR firms within a country. Logue47
and Sundaram (1996) provide a study that looks at valuation ratios, but rather than comparing
valuation ratios directly, they consider changes in valuation ratios around the listing month. They
consider price-to-book, price-to-cash earnings, and price-to-earnings ratios. Their conclusion is that
these ratios increase for firms that list ADRs relative to comparable firms that do not over a period
overlapping the month of listing. This increase in valuation ratios is consistent with a decrease in the
cost of capital. 
Section IV. Why is there a paradox? 
It is clear from theory that a country that liberalizes its capital markets can experience a large
decrease in its cost of capital if the correlation of its market portfolio with the world market portfolio
is not too large or if its volatility is larger than the volatility of the world market portfolio. These
conditions are met for the countries that are used in the studies that we discussed. Further, it is also
clear from theory that firms from segmented markets that succeed in accessing the global capital
markets should face a much lower cost of capital if their return has a low correlation with the world
market portfolio but a high correlation with the local market. Yet, the studies that consider the impact
of liberalization on the cost of capital only find a small but significant impact. 
The studies we considered all investigate how stock prices react to globalization. This
immediately suggests a reason why they might find smaller effects than expected. If financial markets
are efficient, we expect these markets to incorporate information in prices immediately. Consequently,
when a country liberalizes or a firm accesses global capital markets, it is possible that the market
already expected this event to happen to some degree. In the extreme case where the market knows
that a firm will undertake an ADR program, the impact of that program on shareholder wealth will48
be trivial. The same holds for a country’s liberalization. Viewed from this perspective, event studies
have a fundamental problem. If globalization is so advantageous that it becomes largely predictable,
the event studies will never find that it has an impact. The country studies find some impact, but to
understand the implication of that impact for the cost of capital one has to understand the extent to
which the liberalization is anticipated. This is hard to determine. To understand the importance of this
point, suppose that the market expects a liberalization next month with probability 0.9. If the
liberalized country has a cost of capital that is 1,000 bp. less because of liberalization, the stock-price
impact of the decision to liberalize corresponds to a decrease in the cost of capital of 0.1*1,000 bp.,
or 100 bp. Hence, an increase in stock prices could be consistent with a wide variety of changes in
the cost of capital depending on the degree to which liberalization is anticipated. The impact of
anticipation on studies that focus on the dividend yield is more complex, but whenever there is
anticipation, these studies underestimate the impact of liberalization on the cost of capital. The same
argument can be made for studies that focus on the introduction of ADR programs. 
Though anticipation leads to the underestimation of the impact of globalization with the
existing empirical studies, this is not the only reason why the impact of globalization is not as large
as one might expect. The theoretical analyses make the assumption that a country liberalizes or a firm
accesses global capital markets in such a way that they are immediately completely integrated in world
markets. This is rarely the case. A well-documented empirical regularity in international finance is that
investors are not as well-diversified internationally as predicted by the analysis of Section I and that23 See Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), French and Poterba (1991), Kang and Stulz (1997),
and Tesar and Werner (1995). 
24 See Tesar and Werner (1998) for these numbers.
25 See Kang and Stulz (1997) for a discussion of these various explanations and
references. 
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they invest too much in their home country.
23 As an example,
24 in 1996, U.S. investors held 90% of
the value of their stock portfolio in U.S. stocks. At that time, however, U.S. stocks represented less
than half of the world market capitalization of stocks. Consequently, if U.S. investors had been
holding the world market portfolio of stocks, their holdings of U.S. stocks would have represented
less than 50% of their holdings of stocks. The extent of the home bias seems to have fallen for U.S.
investors before the recent bull market. In 1987, U.S. investors held 96.2% of their stock holdings
in U.S. stocks. This home bias exists in all foreign countries for which statistics on ownership are
available. Table II provides further evidence on the home bias. 
Many theories attempt to explain the existence of the home bias. Though rules and laws
limiting foreign portfolio investment have decreased, there are still many restrictions and additional
costs to investing abroad. Interestingly, however, trading securities abroad is no longer necessary to
get the benefits from international diversification. Errunza, Hogan, and Hung (1999) show that the
benefits from international diversification can be obtained by holding foreign securities that trade in
the U.S. either directly, as ADRs or listed foreign stocks, or in closed-end funds. Other reasons for
the home bias have been advanced. In particular, authors have argued that information asymmetries
between domestic and foreign investors, the existence of different consumption baskets, political risk,
and behavioral biases can lead to differences in portfolios and can make portfolios biased toward
domestic assets.
25 Some of these explanations imply that investors do not invest abroad because they50
do not know they would benefit or simply do not want to do so. For instance, Merton (1987)
develops a model where investors invest in shares they know about. Investors who know little about
foreign shares do not invest in them. Other explanations of the home bias lead to the conclusion that
investors stay away more from some countries than from others. For instance, political risk is more
important in some countries than in others. The informational advantage of home country investors
depends on the disclosure and regulatory environment of a country. Consequently, depending on the
institutions of the country that liberalizes, it could be that a country liberalizes but nobody comes to
invest. If a country liberalizes, but markets expect that investors will never take advantage of the
liberalization, then the liberalization does not affect the cost of capital. If a firm starts an ADR
program but foreign investors do not hold the ADRs, much of the benefit of the program will fail to
materialize. In support of this view, Foerster and Karolyi (1999) show that the stock-price impact of
an ADR program depends on how it broadens the shareholder base. 
To understand the implications of the home bias on the cost of capital, suppose that investors
care only about the expected return and the variance of their portfolio and that they have constant
relative risk tolerance. We have two countries, a small country and the rest of the world. For
simplicity, we assume that the market portfolio of the small country and of the rest of the world are
uncorrelated. There are no formal barriers to international investment, but some investors in the small
country do not invest abroad and some investors in the rest of the world do not invest in the small
country. We do not model the reason why investors do not hold foreign securities. Rather, we follow
Merton (1987) and assume that some investors do not hold some securities because they do not know
about them. This amounts to attributing the home bias to ignorance or an unmodeled behavioral bias.
The Appendix provides the details of the model. In Figure 6, we show how the cost of capital of a51
country is affected by the extent of the home bias of its investors and of the home bias of foreign
investors. It is clear from the figure that the impact of globalization on the cost of capital depends
crucially on the extent of the  home bias. As the home bias falls, the cost of capital falls. It could
therefore be the case that a country opens up its markets but the home bias effect is strong enough
that, as a result, there would be little impact on the cost of capital. At the same time, however, the
figure shows the limits of the home bias argument. With our assumptions, the impact of foreign
investors buying local shares on the local cost of capital falls quickly as the proportion of shares held
by foreign investors increases. Hence, it could well be that in many cases, the home bias, large as it
may be, is small enough to enable firms to capture most of the cost of capital benefit of globalization.
Section V. Conclusion. 
We saw in this paper that there are compelling theoretical arguments for globalization to
reduce the cost of capital. There are two main channels through which this reduction in the cost of
capital occurs. The first channel is that globalization reduces the discount rate investors charge. The
second channel is that globalization increases the cash flows investors expect to receive by increasing
the monitoring of management and controlling shareholders. When we turned to empirical evidence,
however, we saw that this evidence is limited and shows that the effect of globalization on the cost
of capital is significant but small. We then argued that one important reason why the impact has been
small is the existence of the home bias. For globalization to reduce the cost of capital, the shareholder
base has to become truly global. This does not occur by decree. As a result, globalization is not an
event but a process. Investors have to be convinced to take advantage of it. Further research should
help to provide a better understanding of this process. 52
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Appendix
1. Let FH be the volatility of return of the small country market portfolio, FW be the volatility of the
return of the market portfolio for the rest of the world, and D be the correlation coefficient between
the two portfolios. Consider a portfolio with an investment of w in the rest of the world and (1-w)
in the small country. The portfolio has a volatility FP given by:
 
Taking the derivative with respect to w and setting w = 0 yields:
A necessary condition for an increase in w from the position of no foreign investment to decrease the
volatility of the portfolio is that the above expression is positive, which is the condition given by
equation (3).
2. Let RT be the relative risk tolerance, h the fraction of investors that invest in their home country
only, FH be the volatility of return of the small country, FW be the volatility of the rest of the world
which is viewed as one country, * the capitalization of the small country as a fraction of the world
capitalization, µD the risk premium of the small country, µW the risk premium of the rest of the world.
We assume zero correlation between the small country and the rest of the world. With constant
relative risk tolerance and zero correlation, we have the following demands for the market portfolio
of the small country:60
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where the demands for the small country market portfolio are, respectively, the demand from the
small country investors without home bias, the demand from the small country investors with home
bias, and the demand from the rest of the world without home bias. In equilibrium, these demands
have to sum up to the market capitalization of the small country market:
where MH  is the capitalization of the small country market portfolio. Figure 6 represents the risk
premium as a function of h taking all other variables as given. 61
Table 1. Estimates of the cost of capital reduction due to globalization. 
The table uses the Datastream weekly indices in dollars from 9/30/88 to 10/28/98 or since they
became available. We denote by “Condition” the difference between the variance of the return of the
country portfolio minus its covariance with the world market portfolio. Condition has to be positive
from the analysis of Section I for the country to have a lower cost of capital in world markets rather









Argentina 0.1635 0.0188 0.0460 0.0266024
Australia 0.0254 0.0018 0.5160 0.0003978
Germany 0.0268 0.0028 0.6450 0.0003897
Belgium 0.0219 0.0028 0.6250 0.0002213
China 0.1189 0.0101 -0.0870 0.0143338
Chile 0.0319 0.0039 0.2530 0.0008672
Canada 0.0186 0.0016 -0.0170 0.0003523
Denmark 0.0249 0.0029 0.4750 0.0003951
Spain 0.0293 0.0027 0.6640 0.0004913
Finland 0.0337 0.0024 0.4570 0.0008429
France 0.0257 0.0028 0.6540 0.0003437
Greece 0.0464 0.0032 0.0280 0.0021245
Hongkong 0.0432 0.0038 0.5050 0.0014521
Indonesia 0.0765 -0.0015 0.2990 0.0054153
Ireland 0.0259 0.0032 0.5700 0.0003927
Italy 0.0351 0.0024 0.4760 0.0009151
Japan 0.0372 -0.0004 0.7610 0.0008465
Korea 0.0515 -0.0005 0.2780 0.002383
Mexico 0.0476 0.0061 -0.0220 0.0022895
Malaysia 0.0552 0.0017 0.4340 0.0025918
Netherland 0.0213 0.0034 0.7300 0.0001595
Norway 0.0338 0.0026 0.5430 0.0007978
New Zealand 0.0283 0.0013 0.4460 0.0005645
Austria 0.0305 0.0021 0.4800 0.0006532
Philippines 0.0477 0.0021 0.3140 0.0019917
Poland 0.0648 -0.0023 0.3830 0.0037289
Portugal 0.0279 0.0018 0.4730 0.0005308
South Africa 0.0338 0.0012 0.4500 0.0008539
Sweden 0.0309 0.0028 0.6180 0.0005945
Singapore 0.0343 0.0018 0.5660 0.0008092
Switzerland 0.0252 0.0034 0.6320 0.0003348
Taiwan 0.0535 0.0027 -0.0750 0.0029377
Thailand 0.0589 0.0020 0.3500 0.0030768
Turkey 0.0727 0.0051 -0.0450 0.0053411
UK 0.0226 0.0029 0.6780 0.0002228
USA 0.0194 0.0033 0.6940 0.0001223
Venezuela 0.0775 0.0045 0.0610 0.0059175
World 0.0189 0.0019 1.000062
Table 2. Estimates of U.S. and foreign ownership for selected emerging markets.
The estimates for developed economies are for 1996 and from Tesar and Werner (1998). For emerging
markets, the estimates of U.S. ownership are from Bekaert and Harvey (1997) who cumulate flow of funds
data until the end of 1995 and the estimates of foreign ownership are from Campollo-Palmer (1997).
U.S. ownership as percent of
market capitalization



























Figure 1. Volatility of the portfolio of the investor from the small country with a small
investment in the global equity markets.
This figure shows the volatility of the return of the portfolio of the small country investor,  FPortfolio,
when the portfolio share of the global market is 0.10. The volatility of the return of the market
portfolio of the small country is assumed to be 25%. FPortfolio is shown as a function of the volatility
of the world market portfolio, FWorld, and the correlation between the return of the small country
market portfolio and the world market portfolio, DSmall country,World, where the world market portfolio
does not include the small country market portfolio. 64
Figure 2. Maximum correlation coefficient required for globalization to decrease the cost of
capital of the small country.
This figure shows the correlation coefficient,  D DWorld after, such that the cost of capital is the same when
the small country is segmented from the global equity market and when it is integrated. The figure
shows this correlation as a function of the volatility of the world market portfolio, FWorld , and of the
volatility of the small country market portfolio,  FSmall Country. The distribution of the world market
portfolio is taken to be fixed. Whenever the correlation coefficient is smaller, the cost of capital is
lower when the small country is part of the global equity market. 65
Figure 3. Impact on the volatility of the world market portfolio, FWorld after, of adding a country
to the world market portfolio. We assume that the volatility of the world market portfolio before
adding a country is 15%. The old market portfolio represents 90% of the new one, so that the new
country has a weight of 10% in the new market portfolio. We express FWorld after as a function of the
volatility of the small country market portfolio, FSmall country, and the correlation between the small
country market portfolio and the world market portfolio before the addition, DSmall country,World before.66













































































Figure 4. Word portfolio return volatility
This volatility is computed monthly from daily returns of the Datastream world portfolio using the




Figure 5. The cost of capital after liberalization. 
This figure shows the cost of capital after liberalization, rAfter, given a 30% increase in market
capitalization as a result of liberalization, as a function of the dividend growth rate, g, and the cost
of capital before liberalization, rBefore.68
Figure 6. Home bias and the cost of capital. 
This figure shows the relation between the risk premium of the local market, µLocal, and the fraction
of investors who invest at home only, h, assuming that the volatility of the local market is 30%, that
the local market is uncorrelated with the world market, that the local market is 10% of the world
equity capitalization, and that the coefficient of relative risk tolerance is 2. 